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#### Interpretation and violation – the plan is an economic inducement – engagement requires trade promotion

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Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

#### **Vote neg**

#### **1. Limits – broad interpretations allow anything to do with the economy**

#### **2. Ground – trade is the only stable mechanism for links**

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#### The United States federal government should condition substantially financing for non-corn biofuels in Mexico on the Mexican government taking action to end human rights abuses by Mexican forces. The United States federal government should enact a periodic certification process to determine that abuses are effectively investigated and prosecuted.

#### Aid without human rights conditions send the message that US condones torture and violence – turns the aff and reinforces organized crime

**WOLA 10** – Washington Office on Latin America (“Congress: Withhold Funds for Mexico Tied to Human Rights Performance,” 9/14/2010, <http://www.wola.org/publications/congress_withhold_funds_for_mexico_tied_to_human_rights_performance>) //RGP

However, research conducted by our respective organizations, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, and even the State Department’s own reports, demonstrates conclusively that Mexico has failed to meet the four human rights requirements set out by law. As a result, Congress should not release these select Merida funds. Releasing these funds would send the message that the United States condones the grave human rights violations committed in Mexico, including torture, rape, killings, and enforced disappearances.¶ We recognize that Mexico is facing a severe public security crisis, and that the United States can play a constructive role in strengthening Mexico’s ability to confront organized crime in an effective manner. However, human rights violations committed by Mexican security forces are not only deplorable in their own right, but also significantly undermine the effectiveness of Mexico’s public security efforts. Building trust between the Mexican people and the government is essential to gathering information to dismantle organized crime. When security forces commit grave human rights violations and they are not held accountable for their actions, they lose that trust, alienating key allies and leaving civilians in a state of terror and defenselessness. It is thus in the interest of both of our countries to help Mexico curb systematic human rights violations, ensure that violations are effectively investigated and those responsible held accountable, and assess candidly the progress Mexico is making towards improving accountability and transparency. ¶ Evidence demonstrates that Mexico is not fulfilling effectively any of the requirements established by Congress, particularly those dealing with prosecuting military abuses and torture:

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#### Food management is the framework for biopolitical control in which the subjugation of populations is done for the falsified ‘good’ of the majority

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Introduction

In the late 1970s Michel Foucault began exploring the emergence of a new technique of government that established ‘the basic biological features of the human species’ (Foucault 2007, 1) as the primary object of political strategy. In The history of sexuality, Foucault famously outlined the significance of this development:

 The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life. During the classical period, there was a rapid development of various disciplines – universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the era of bio-power. (1980, 140, emphasis added)¶ For Foucault, what distinguishes the early from the late modern period is the fact that sovereign power is defined less as the ‘right to kill’ and more as the ability to seize, manage and exert influence over the living conditions of individual bodies and whole populations. This does not mean that the ‘power of death’ is completely abandoned, but rather that violence must be rationalised by appealing to future improvements: the pauper will be converted into a sturdy labourer; the prisoner will be rehabilitated; savage populations will be civilised; and wastelands will be transformed into productive environments (Darby 1973; Murray Li 2007, 13). Accordingly, the ‘era of bio-power’ heralded a new taxonomy of everyday life: through administrative measures life itself could be subjugated and managed with a view to the betterment and greater security of humankind (Foucault 1980 2008;Legg 2005; Lemke 2001).¶ This genealogy of biopolitics is now familiar enough and hardly requires further elaboration.1 This paper instead aims to empirically develop Foucault’s conceptual history by exploring the biopolitics of the modern food economy. The focus on food provisioning is deemed appropriate for two reasons. First, the ongoing publication of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, especially his lectures in 1977–1978, entitled Security, territory, and population, show that Foucault placed the history of food provisioning – and especially the problem of food scarcity – at the very centre of his account of biopower. But while the lecture courses have generated considerable debate, the importance of food in these discussions is generally ignored or poorly reviewed.2 Secondly, in considering food provisioning to be a material expression of biopower, Foucault’s work provides a bridge between research emphasising the political economy of agro-food systems (Friedmann and McMichael 1989) and work that studies the political strategies that regulate biological life (Rabinow and Rose 2006). While the former has enhanced our understanding of the socio-economic transformations, the latter properly reminds us that the spatial dynamics of states and capital are also vital processes (Kearns and Reid-Henry 2009) that can encourage, undermine or otherwise attenuate the potential for life to replenish and flourish. The biopolitics of food provisioning is therefore, a lens to think about how the management of food maps onto strategies for managing life, a synergy that becomes more pronounced as agrarian structures are transformed to suit commercial interests rather than human needs.¶ My argument proceeds in four parts. The first part reviews Foucault’s writing on food provisioning, the problem of security and the problem of scarcity. I relate these reflections to Foucault’s concern with the ‘economic management of society’, particularly the relationship between laissez-faire economics and liberal government. The second part examines the issue of food provisioning in Europe’s colonies where in fact the drive to eliminate non-market access to food was more acute and biopolitical controls were adopted with greater fervour. The final two sections of the paper use the idea of a ‘biopolitics of food provisioning' to examine corporate efforts to gain control over agricultural life and to turn agrarian systems into a vehicle for capital accumulation (Kloppenburg 2004, 8). The process of commodification through biotechnical innovation – what I term accumulation by molecularisation– is profoundly transforming the evolutionary life of animals and plants, and, in some cases, the very existence of the hungry poor who are finding that their access to vital provisions, and indeed their control over the means of production, is being progressively eroded.¶ Homo æconomicus and the problem of scarcity¶ The content of the lectures delivered under the title, Security, territory, and population, might surprise some scholars who believe that Foucault’s concern with the politics of truth is developed at the expense of the vital role of political economy. In these lectures Foucault (2007, 2, 11) shows a strong interest in ‘economic transformations’, which he attempts to define in terms of a much broader history of ‘apparatuses (dispositifs) of security’. This new project opens up four overlapping concerns: first what Foucault (2007, 11) outlines as ‘spaces of security’; second, the management of the uncertain or ‘aleatory’; third, new mechanisms of normalisation; and finally, the emergence of the population as a political-economic problem, and later as a problem of ‘conduct’.¶ To begin, Foucault shows how these ‘apparatuses of security’ are materialised in the changing morphology of cities in the 17th and 18th centuries. Through the construction of the ‘disciplinary town’, hazards like theft and disease could be minimised and positive elements like the circulation of capital could be reinforced and optimised. Gradually, the spatial fabric of the town – the construction of quays, the partitioning of streets and the spacing of workshops – becomes ordered in such as way as to better manage the population in relation to ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ occurrences. Focusing on town plans and key urban texts, Foucault shows how¶ the territorial sovereign became an architect of the disciplined space, but also, and almost at the same time, the regulator of the milieu, which involved establishing not so much limits and frontiers, or fixing locations, as, above all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing, and ensuring circulations. (2007, 29)¶ This emphasis on the city as a site of circulation, and the sovereign as the ‘regulator of the milieu’, forms the background to Foucault’s longer discussion of scarcity (la disette) and the policing of grain. The supply and provisioning of food, particularly the threat posed by urban food shortages, brings into sharp relief the concerns highlighted by Foucault earlier in the course. On the one hand, there is the priority of upholding the people’s subsistence rights (what peasants viewed as ‘laws of necessity’) in order to prevent future convulsions and civil disorder. Against this is the emergence of commercial pressures to ensure the optimal circulation of capital and goods. The latter is presented first as a case for purging bad conduct (such as eradicating hoarding, regrating and forestalling practices), but is subsequently theorised as a case for promoting the freedom of trade as a public good in itself.

#### Claims about Asian instability are rooted in security discourse that is epistemologically racist.

**Nizamani 2K** (Haider Nizamani, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of British Columbia, 2k [The roots of rhetoric: politics of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, p. 9-10)

For Buzan and Holsti the “weak states” are perceived as fixed entities in the global system. What is defined as a “weak” state turns out to be more of a symptomatic mixing of causes with effects rather than an analytical tool.46 Ironically, the analyses of Third World security since Buzan’s pioneering work have assumed this dichotomy without critically examining it, thus reifying a questionable assertion. In defining a “weak” state causes are mixed with effects without clearly defining the relationship. For example, a weak state is one where the question of legitimate use of force is unresolved (an effect), and the colonial demarcation of boundaries is to be blamed for a number of problems faced by these states (a cause). Others echo this concern by arguing that “legitimacy—that authority which rests on the shared cultural identity of ruler and the ruled—is the most precious resource of any regime” and states are “weak” in the Third World because regimes are constantly faced with legitimacy crises.47 Dichotomizing states into binary opposites on the basis of such characteristics is indicative of “logocentrism,” which in this specific context becomes security orientalism.48 Logocentricism views the world in practical oppositions such as domestic/international, core/periphery. Encountering such oppositions, “the logocentric disposition inclines a participant in the regime of modernity to impose hierarchy,…(in) which one side can be conceived as a higher reality.” A model based on logocentric procedure divides countries on the basis of their characteristics and establishes dichotomies of Us and Them, good and bad, and so forth. The Other is judged and classified to be “weak” in the context of how much different it is from Us (i.e., the ‘‘strong” West). The more striking the differences are, the weaker that state is. Hence, the difference itself becomes an explanation. This, in short, is security orientalism, which juxtaposes the mature West with the infantile non-West and subordinates the latter into perpetual contrast with the former. The Pakistani state acts the way it does because it is “weak,” and its weakness is based upon its differences from the “strong” West. The weak states model’s view of the non-Western world is a result of what T. N. Madan has aptly termed as three deceptions. First, they have had their traditions tampered with, eroded, and invented, often with the help of anthropologists and historians. Second, they are deceived societies as they have their present transformed into a permanent transition: the developing societies will forever remain developing societies if they are to catch up with the so-called developed but, in fact, runaway societies. The seven industrialized countries (G-7) are like the constellation of seven stars that point to the fixed pole star, but the goals of development do not remain fixed, they recede further away. Finally, these societies are deceived for the third time because their future has been preempted.49 Given epistemological privileging of the West over the rest, the “weak states” model can hardly help us understand the nuances of nuclear discourse in the subcontinent except by blaming the outcomes on the weakness of the Indian and Pakistani states. Rather than indulging in such circular logic, we have to locate the rise of the nuclear weapons politics by situating it in the context of attempts by the postcolonial dominant episteme to create newer versions of national selves. It is here that I go beyond the disciplinary confines of security studies and delve into relevance of discourse analysis to shed new light on the nuclear issue. The focus is on the processes that constitute the political world of an issue.

#### Economic threat predictions are a means of political ordering under the guise of military subjugation—all who don’t conform to the economic order are slaughteredNeocleous 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, p95- MT)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its **economic strength**– in order **to** **re-order the world**. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped **co-opt the liberal Left** into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, **on pain of extinction**, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant **reshaping of world order** and resulting in a comprehensive level of **intervention and policing all over the globe**. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently **violent strategy**. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘**rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states** on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new ‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the **slaughter bench of history**. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow anygovernment in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of con tainment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

**Their rhetoric of failed states and spheres of influence reifies an imperialistic approach to Latin America.**

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Terms such as the North–South divide, and centre–periphery relations are constructs which reflect a posited distinction between two sets of countries within the international system. More fundamentally one can suggest that this difference is anchored in imperial power—that the imperial difference is the difference between imperial societies and imperialised societies; and, despite the complex heterogeneities existing within both categories, there is a profound asymmetrical relation that is rooted in a history of power and knowledge. This relation has not been transcended—we do not live in a post-imperial world—and the imperial nature of power continues to affect and insinuate itself into a range of social, political and cultural phenomena. It is an imperial mentality which can be traced through a lineage of invasiveness and penetration, of the imposition of the values and organisational forms of the imperialising society on to the imperialised society, of a violation of political sovereignty, of an erasure or belittling of the other's sense of indigenous cultural value, of a subordinating mode of representation, encapsulated in such notions as ‘**traditional society’, ‘failed’ or ‘rogue state’, and ‘emerging economy’**, and in an overarching assumption of guidance, authority and leadership. Within this context **the West is seen as special**—the home of reason, human rights, democracy, self-reflexivity—and this special-ness is interpreted as having been achieved in an independent fashion without the need of learning from inter-cultural encounters.69 In this vision the geopolitics of knowledge is centred on the West and **the non-West is depicted as inferior**, in need of tutelage and constant supervision: as Césaire put it over 50 years ago, ‘the West alone knows how to think … at the borders of the Western world there begins the shadowy realm of primitive thinking, which, dominated by the notion of participation, incapable of logic, is the very model of faulty thinking’.70 The posited inability of the non-West to think in terms that might be globally relevant and to have the capacity to be an independent agent can be briefly illustrated through reference to two examples from **the history of US–Latin American relations.** First, in relation to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a series of scholarly meetings was set up in the late 1980s to bring together the key participants in the crisis. It was not until the third such meeting that Cuban representatives were even invited and then only at Soviet insistence. US representatives resisted Cuban participation on the grounds that this would turn the meeting into a ‘political circus’.71 It emerged from these meetings that the crisis could not end until Castro permitted the missiles to be removed, in exchange for a Soviet brigade to defend Cuba. Cuba was not recognised as an important actor in the crisis by the US representatives; moreover Cuba was seen, in general, as not being capable of rational decision making. Second, in President Reagan's address to the nation on the situation in Nicaragua, broadcast in March 1986, one encounters a related framing of a geopolitical issue. Reagan introduced the topic of the address by stating that there was a ‘mounting danger in Central America that threatens the security of the United States … I'm speaking of Nicaragua, a Soviet ally on the American mainland only two hours’ flying time from our own borders’.72 Having established the existence of a severe danger and its proximity to the US, Reagan went on to argue that the threat came not so much from Nicaragua itself but from the fact that its territory was being used by the Soviet enemy, the ‘evil Empire’. The Sandinistas were subsumed under the label of Soviet-bloc communists and their Nicaraguan collaborators. Reagan went on to state that the Soviets, together with the Sandinistas, must not be permitted to ‘crush freedom’ in Central America, and ‘threaten our own security on our own doorstep’. Overall, what happens here is that the Sandinistas are shorn of independent agency; they are depicted as being manipulated by an external and tyrannical power—**they do not possess their own agency**, and are not able to decide independently their own path to development. At the time, García Márquez singled out this relational proclivity, arguing that within the US there was a widespread tendency to believe that Latin American peoples were not able to think for themselves and be independent of the two blocs, West and East. If a Latin American government was acting independently this must have meant that it was being manipulated by an external power. Conclusions This is very much a ‘work in progress’, being constrained by the limitations of space, and any conclusions must be seen as tentative and provisional. The way I have been trying to analyse the geopolitics of imperial power in a context of US–Latin American relations owes a good deal to approaches that do not marginalise the insights of political economy perspectives, but attempt to open up new multifaceted pathways for critical discussion, seen broadly in a post-structuralist, and post- or de-colonial framework.73 I have argued that, in the case of the US, the imperial mentality is deeply rooted in society, and affects all spheres of social and political life. It is partly driven by economic imperatives, but crucially needs to be understood in the arena of state–society relations, and especially within the ambit of the state, where the agents of power construct and deploy imperial policies. The desire to penetrate, invade and restructure another society is concentrated into a political will that gives expression to the varied compulsions working inside the imperial society. Capacities are developed to enact this will and modes of justification are set in train to support the imperial drive. In the US and other Western societies the imperial drive has never been confronted in a comprehensive manner and the key facets of the imperial character continue to flow through the political veins of Western society. When it is remarked that the reaction to 9/11, the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib express violent entailments of imperial history, and that they are at once anachronistic and geopolitically resonant, it is as if they are both ‘boldly new and disturbingly the same’.74

#### Their security discourse replicates global power imbalances and causes serial policy failure

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3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus c alls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.

#### The alt is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac --- this is a prerequisite to successful policy.

**Ahmed 12** Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

### mexico

#### No risk of Chinese maritime disputes

**Fravel ’12** (M. TAYLOR FRAVEL is an associate professor of political science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All Quiet in the South China Sea Why China is Playing Nice (For Now) M. Taylor Fravel March 22, 2012

Little noticed, however, has been China's recent adoption of a new -- and much more moderate -- approach. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to restore China's tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role there. The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit paved the way for an agreement in July 2011 between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finally implement a declaration of a code of conduct they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes." Since the summer, senior Chinese officials, especially top political leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly reaffirmed the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas." Authoritative Chinese-language media, too, has begun to underscore the importance of cooperation. Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies. In terms of actually setting aside disputes, China has made progress. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands. China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is probably more than just a mere stalling tactic. Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also halted many of the more assertive behaviors that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor. The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship. By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region. So far, Beijing's new approach seems to be working, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

#### Mexican economy resilient

**Nevaer, 09** [Lous—New America Media, News Report, “In Global Economic Crisis, Mexico Is Resilient”]

http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view\_article.html?article\_id=b8dc03d6f2792eba9e84392106c2c6f4>

MERIDA, Mexico – The economic crisis sweeping the globe has spared no nation, but some are showing remarkable resilience. Mexico's economic performance, for example, has shown tremendous strength. When the U.S. Federal Reserve extended a loan of $30 billion each to the central banks of Brazil, South Korea, Singapore and Mexico, Mexico did not touch those funds. It simply reinvested them in Treasury bonds, leaving them in accounts in New York. This is no accident. It stems from prudent economic policies implemented after the December 1994 devaluation of the Mexican peso that sent the economy into a tailspin. At that time, President Ernesto Zedillo had been in office a few days, and his entire agenda was thrown into disarray by the crisis. The Clinton administration had to issue an emergency $50 billion loan –- which Mexico paid back ahead of schedule and with interest -– and the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, helped craft a recovery program. It was a painful adjustment as budgets were slashed, fiscal restraint was implemented across the board, and the Mexican people saw their investments and savings diminish. That was 15 years ago, and the lessons learned the hard way are now paying off: Mexico's stock market fell 23 percent in 2008, the "best" performing major index at a time when the U.S. markets fell 38 percent and Russian markets collapsed by an astounding 70 percent. Last fall, some feared that the Mexican economy would not be able to escape the turmoil engulfing the United States, and the Mexican peso fell almost 30 percent vis-à-vis the American dollar. It has since recovered, although it has suffered a 20 percent devaluation since the economic crisis began last summer. These currency fluctuations reflect the fact that, because of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, neither Mexico nor Canada have "decoupled" from the U.S. economy. There are several reasons for Mexico's economic resilience. One is the fiscal restraint that Zedillo initiated and that his successor, Vicente Fox, continued. Fox, a former corporate executive, made significant strides in eliminating Mexico's foreign debt. Mexico's current president, Felipe Calderon, has kept spending in line, even as revenues have increased. When disaster struck, Mexico had a balanced budget, almost no foreign debt and rising federal revenues, allowing it to intervene to stabilize prices. Mexico also dodged the housing speculation that brought its neighbor to its knees. Mexico's financial system has always been stringent in extending credit. Americans roll their eyes at the bureaucracy this entailed –- two forms of ID are required to open a bank account in Mexico; when customers request checks, they have to pick them up at the bank, where their signature and ID are verified; credit card applications must be made in person at the financial institution, and not over the phone or through unsolicited mail-in applications. As a result, "identity theft" is almost non-existent in Mexico, and it was nearly impossible for a housing bubble to emerge there. Another factor is the windfall oil profits – despite the sudden drop in oil prices. When oil peaked at $147 a barrel last summer, there was disbelief around the world: Would it shoot up to $200 or fall back? The conventional wisdom was that $100 a barrel for oil was the new reality going forward, and there was a frenzy to lock in prices through futures contracts. Mexican officials at Pemex, the state-owned oil monopoly, didn't believe that price was sustainable; their economic models indicated that, with slacking demand due to the recession, a price range between $60 and $80 was "sustainable." Other countries -– most notably Venezuela and Russia –- were more ambitious, and reckless. Both countries let spending explode, believing that they could finance anything they wanted. The economies in both countries today are in freefall. Mexico, by comparison, was prudent, saving the oil windfall, and Mexican traders implemented a strategy that hinged on the price of oil falling below the $60 to $80 range. "They're great traders," Phil Flynn, an analyst at Alaron Trading Corp., said of Pemex futures traders. "If the economy continues to slow, they're looking like geniuses." The world economy has more than slowed: It has hit a wall. And Mexico is collecting $90 to $110 per barrel today, for oil that is trading in the $38 to $45 range at the beginning of 2009. Having hedged its exports, Mexico is getting a premium, and a significant windfall that will total several billion dollars this year, enough to sustain social spending without massive federal deficits

#### Status quo solves energy connectivity

**ENS 12** – Environmental News Service

(“U.S., Canada, Mexico Vow ‘Continental’ Energy Grid,” http://www.reepedia.com/archives/4568)//BB

The leaders of the United States, Mexico, and Canada today pledged to develop “continental energy, including electricity generation and interconnection” across national borders and welcomed “increasing North American energy trade.”¶ Meeting in Washington, U.S. President Barack Obama, Canada’s President Stephen Harper and Mexico’s President Felipe Calderon committed their governments to enhance their collective energy security, to facilitate “seamless energy flows on the interconnected grid” and to promote trade and investment in clean energy technologies.¶ They will cooperate in expanding cooperation “to create clean energy jobs and combat climate change,” the leaders said in a joint statement

### econ

#### Diversionary war theory is false --- they’ve got it backwards --- low growth makes countries cautious.

**Boehmer, 07** – political science professor at the University of Texas (Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, WEA)

Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

#### The economy is resilient and the impact is empirically denied

**Zakaria, ‘9** - Fareed (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2>]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

### resource

#### Status quo Biotech solves.

**Grain News 10** – (Biotechnology Could Solve Famine And Malnutrition, 7/27/10 AB)

Dallas, TX (July 16, 2010) -- The use of biotechnology to create genetically modified crops can meet the needs of a growing population,according to a new study by the [National Center for Policy Analysis](http://www.ncpa.org/) (NCPA), especially as the world's population growsfrom six billion to approximately nine billion people this century. "If the government removed bans and strict regulations on biotechnology, the world could produce more than enough food for the growing population to have minimally adequate diets," said NCPA Senior Fellow, H. Sterling Burnett. The "precautionary principle" used by radical environmentalists to prevent the use of biotechnology, is based on the idea that precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. "This is just like saying 'better safe than sorry,'" Burnett said. "However,genetically modified crops are already in widespread use around the world and have been shown to have no harmful effects to date. They are already providing benefits to millions of people worldwide." Golden rice, or rice genetically altered to contain beta carotene and new genes to overcome iron deficiency, is preventing thousands of cases of childhood blindness and reducing anemia, according to the NCPA study. Additionally, through genetic modification,crops can be altered to improve various crops' nutritional value and reduce the environmental impact of farming, which are very important factors as the population and demand for food grow, Burnett adds, noting the world will need to produce three times more food than is currently produced**.** "Government regulations will only serve to stifle innovation and reduce the benefits of bioengineered crops," Burnett said. "The government should not limit access to biotechnology advances in the developing world, which is most in need of these agricultural breakthroughs.

#### Scarcity doesn’t cause war – 5 reasons

**Deudney 99** (Daniel, Asst Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics )

Another major limitation of most studies on environmental conflict is that they rarely consider the character of the overall international system in assessing the prospects for conflict and violence. Of course, it is impossible to analyze everything at once, but conclusions about conflictual outcomes are premature until the main features of the world political system are factored in. The frequency with which environmental scarcity and conflict will produce violent conflict, particularly interstate wars, is profoundly shaped by six features of contemporary world politics: (1) the prevalance of capitalism and the extent of international trade; (2) the existence of numerous functional international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and epistemic communities; (3) highly developed state-system institutions; and (4) the existence of nuclear weapons; (5) the widespread diffusion of conventional weaponry; and (6) the influence of a hegemonic coalition of liberal constitutional democracies. These deeply rooted material and institutional features of the contemporary world order greatly reduce the likelihood that environmental scarcities and change will lead to interstate violence (see figure 8.1).

#### Even if it does, it won’t escalate.

**Salehyan, 07** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Northern Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August 2007, May 29th 2010, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>, KONTOPOULOS)

Dire scenarios like these may sound convincing, but they are misleading. Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments. Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters. Second, arguing that climate change is a root cause of conflict lets tyrannical governments off the hook. If the environment drives conflict, then governments bear little responsibility for bad outcomes. That’s why Ban Ki-moon’s case about Darfur was music to Khartoum’s ears. The Sudanese government would love to blame the West for creating the climate change problem in the first place. True, desertification is a serious concern, but it’s preposterous to suggest that poor rainfall—rather than deliberate actions taken by the Sudanese government and the various combatant factions—ultimately caused the genocidal violence in Sudan. Yet by Moon’s perverse logic, consumers in Chicago and Paris are at least as culpable for Darfur as the regime in Khartoum.

#### Mexican biofuels increase food prices

**Lenti, 11** [Americas South and North, “Mexico would be a world leader in biofuels-if not for its peasants,” says a U.S. energy executive,” <http://americasouthandnorth.wordpress.com/author/jlenti/>, ALB]

Before considering these words in depth, a little context. Recently, an AeroMexico plane departing from Mexico City touched down in Madrid and in the process became the world’s first transatlantic commercial flight powered entirely by biodiesel. Many environmentalists in Mexico and abroad applauded the achievement. Some expressed trepidation, and with good cause. The debate over biofuels has raged for the better part of the past decade in the United States and has now arrived to Mexico. The crux of the issue is the same in either setting: What effects will a rising demand to produce the fuels have on agricultural systems and the people that live in them? Advocates of biodiesel make the obvious statement: the prices of food staples such as corn and sugar, until now the primary bases of ethanol, will rise. In Mexico there is another crop with incredible biofuel potential – agave, the basis of tequila. An increased demand for crops and the corresponding price increases for those crops is easily advertised as a win-win for everyone involved; as much as for the distributor of biodiesel as for the farmer who grew the ingredient crop.

#### Scarcity spurs innovation which prevents war

**Meierding, 07** – Ph.D. Student at the University of Chicago (Emily, “Strategic Substitution and the Declining Likelihood of International Resource Wars”, March 2007 prepared for the International Studies Association Conference)

If these intra-disciplinary critics collectively call into question the resource pessimists’ claim that resource scarcity frequently leads to violent conflict, a more fundamental critique has emerged from resource economists. Resource “cornucopians” argue that the very concept of scarcity is flawed. Julian Simon, the most prominent of these claimants, asserts that market demand for increasingly scarce goods inspires technological innovation, which resolves supply problems through improvements in productive efficiency or through the creation of substitute inputs. When consumers demand a resource, more of it, or of a functional substitute, is supplied. Human knowledge, he claims, is “the ultimate resource.” The cornucopian argument suggests that natural resource scarcity should not have a significant impact on the likelihood of conflict. Future resource-inspired violence will be rare.

# 2nc

#### 2. Ontology and epistemology come first

Fernando **Cavalcante 11**, Ph.D. Candidate at the Centre for Social Studies, Coimbra University, Portugal, March 16, 2011, “The Underlying Premises of UN Peacebuilding: Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p501820\_index.html

Before presenting how ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects influence „concrete‟ policies, it is important to discuss how they are defined and their relationship. According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology, ontology “refers to metaphysical issues concerned with the nature of existence and the structure of reality at large” (2006: 423). Ontological inquiries thus relate to assumptions about the nature, the structure, the components (units) and the dynamics that are to be known, which are all within what is generally referred to as „reality‟. Ontological questions, therefore, relate to what one assumes to constitute reality. However, how can we know something? The answer to this question is related to epistemological claims. Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, “tries to answer questions about the nature, sources, scope and justification of knowledge” (ibid.: 171). Hence, when one speaks of epistemology one speaks of what s/he considers as knowledge, of what s/he considers as the basis for that knowledge, of what can be known and of what criteria matters to justify his or her knowledge as knowledge – and not a belief or something else. Epistemology, therefore, relates to claims about what is knowledge and how can one know about something. As abstract as such concepts may be, they provide a deeper and more thorough understanding of theories since they explore the assumptions adopted prior to the very creation of theories. For instance, it is a specific ontological position – that the „reality‟ of international politics is constituted by a (materialist) structure made of states – that allows Waltz (1979) to explain that anarchy is a constant state of being of the „international system‟: a Hobbesian state of “war of all against all”. However, by adopting an ontology in which the „reality‟ of international politics is understood to be constituted by a (social) structure made of states‟ intersubjective practices, Wendt explains that anarchy is not a constant state of being of the „international system‟, but rather “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992; see also Wendt, 1999). The ontological choices made by those theorists, therefore, have a significant influence on both Waltz‟s neorealism and Wendt‟s constructivism, as well as on any other theoretical discussion supported by each of those theoretical models. Although adopting different ontological positions, both Waltz and Wendt have relied on the same (positivist) epistemology. Epistemological choices nevertheless affect how a theory is created and applied. Regarding issues in the realm of epistemology, examples abound in IR, since the different epistemological positions adopted by IR scholars are at the core of the “fourth debate” of the discipline (on IR 'grand debates', see Wæver, 1996). Feminist theories are only one of such examples.1 Their theorists have firmly pointed out how minorities and marginalised groups have been excluded from international relations “not only at the level of discrimination but also through a process of self-selection [conducted by elite males in Anglo- and Euro-centric contexts] which begins with the way in which we are taught about international relations” (Tickner, 1988: 430). Still related to epistemology and ontology, methodology deals with how actual research is, or should be, conducted. According to Norman Blaikie, methodology also deals with logics of enquiry, of how new knowledge is generated and justified. This includes a consideration of how theories are generated and tested – what kind of logic should be used, what a theory looks like, what criteria a theory has to satisfy, how it relates to a particular research problem, and how it can be tested. (Blaikie, 2000: 8)2 However, how do epistemological, ontological and methodological choices relate to each other? Grix‟s answer to the question is based on the following scheme: [Figure 1 omitted] According to Grix, alongside methods and sources, such choices are the “building blocks”, the core components of research.3 They are interrelated according to a specific directional pattern: the fundamental and starting point of research, he argues, is an ontological claim, since “research necessarily starts from a person‟s view of the world” (Grix, 2002: 179). That claim is then followed by an epistemological assumption on how that same person can gather knowledge about that same world, and by a methodological question about “how to go about acquiring it” (ibid.: 179). Whilst the rationale involves a rather controversial discussion,4 I adopt such a logical sequence in this paper as a starting point anyway – since this is a work in progress, this initial assumption might be challenged and criticised in a more advanced stage of research. Considering the role of ontological, epistemological and methodological options in shaping theories and concepts, as well as the influence of these theories and concepts, either explicitly or implicitly, in policymaking and in the implementation of policies, I thus suggest they have fundamental importance for understanding the theoretical and conceptual bases of policies and subsequent courses of action. I now turn to the concrete case of UN peacebuilding as an illustration for that conceptual framework.

#### X. Critical theory outweighs policy making --- voting affirmative guarantees error replication. Only a radical break from dominant paradigms can avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy

**Cheeseman & Bruce 1996** (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated.¶ This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15¶ The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democraticdialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power.¶ In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security.¶ This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years.¶ There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. Firstcomes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, thenspecific policies may follow.¶ As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

#### Util justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

**Weizman 11** (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

#### Cloaking DA - The reasons for pursuing a policy are central to understanding it, we must reject liberal reforms that mask the security apparatus by shifting the frame of debate because they effectively kill critique and sustain security logic.

**Burke 2007** (Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2007, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 1-4, MT)

Working between international relations, philosophy, and political and cultural theory, and with those whose daily suffering is most shocking and unbearable in mind, this book thus brings sustained critical attention to the promises and practices of security, ethics and violence as they manifest themselves in the statecraft, foreign policy, diplomacy, terrorism, war-making, geopolitics and strategy of the last few decades. This book does so to sound a warning: that not only are global patterns of insecurity, violence and conflict getting ever more destructive and out of hand, but that the dominant conceptual and policy frameworks we use to understand and respond to them are deeply inadequate and dangerous. Given this danger, the book insists upon a ‘critical’ approach: one that refuses to accept the representations of the world most available to us and apparently most credible, but instead questions the very categories we have used to understand and shape our modernity and its relation to power, violence and existence. Hence none of these things – ethics, violence, security or war – are taken for granted, as if we know what they are and how they fit together. Rather this is a book that asks about the kind of violence that war is, that we think and allow it to be; that asks about the kind of ethics that relates to security and violence, that by turns condemns, demands or exonerates killing; that asks about the violence that we think enables, defends or threatens security; and that asks about the security that conjures violence from its soul, which pushes kindness or cruelty or murder through its veins like a life-giving fluid. It asks if violence is really as rational, ethical and controllable as we believe; if a security that hinges upon violence is tenable or meaningful, and if it can be refigured; and it asks if ethics can offer us a path beyond violence or is in danger of becoming reduced to it. While a concern with ethics, as both a source of hope and danger, is a central theme of the book, it is not based on an approach that brings ‘ethics’, as a fully formed and systematic body of principles, to something that lies outside it: ‘security’, ‘war’ or ‘international relations’. Rather it interrogates the very practical and conceptual structure of these processes, along with ethical 4 reasoning itself, in order to understand the ethical outcomes of various approaches to security and violence even when they claim to be governed by the demands of ethics. Nor are ethics, security and violence the limit of this book’s concerns. It puts significant related ideas under scrutiny: sovereignty, freedom, identity and power. These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'. It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity.  As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

#### Deterrence rewards brinksmanship leading to rapid escalation

**Trachtenberg 2002** (Marc, Prof. Pol. Sci. – UCLA, The National Interest, “Waltzing to Armageddon?” Fall, L/N, MT)

Waltz does not approach the problem this way. For him, wars are started by one side or another. There is an attacker and a defender; with nuclear weapons, the attacker is deterred and war is avoided. "Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense", he asks, "who will dare to start them?" The Soviet Union would have been deterred by any state that might have been able to deliver one or two simple fission bombs on Moscow. Indeed, he argues, "with nuclear weapons, any state will be deterred by another state's second-strike forces." "A nation", he says, "will be deterred from attacking even if it believes there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate." There is no doubt in Waltz's mind about this; for him, the deterrent effect is absolute: no one will start a war, and wars-at least major wars, wars in which nuclear weapons will be used-will simply not happen. In the real world, however, wars are often not simply "started" by one side, and the distinction between defender and attacker can be very problematic. In 1914, for example, who "started" the First World War? Germany, by invading Belgium and attacking France? Or Russia, by ordering general mobilization a few days earlier, knowing full well that such action made war virtually inevitable? Who was the "defender"? Austria, supported by Germany, for trying to prevent Serbia from serving as a base for terrorist activities directed against the Habsburg Monarchy? Or Russia, supported by the Western powers, for trying to defend Serbian sovereignty and maintain its own political position in the Balkans? And if all the major powers had been armed with nuclear weapons at the time, is it clear who exactly would have been deterred? Or take the case of the coming of World War II in 1939. If both Britain and Germany had been nuclear powers at the time, again, is it clear who would have been deterred? Waltz thinks that Germany would have backed off: Hitler would not have "started" a war that would destroy the Third Reich. But Hitler did not intend to "start" a war with Britain at that point; his aim was to get Britain to back down in the confrontation over Poland. Nor did Britain intend to start a war with Germany. War broke out not because either side wanted war in late 1939, but rather because neither was willing to give way-and because each was hoping that the other would. Once we get away from the idea that wars are simply "started" by one side and that the "attacker" can be readily identified, the whole problem appears in an entirely different light. If war is seen as the outcome of a process in which two sides interact, it makes no sense to focus simply on the calculations of just one side. Instead, the calculations of both sides, and especially their calculations about each other, have to be taken into account. Each side may be trying to deter the other-to get its way without war if it can. Each side might be afraid of escalation, but those fears are balanced by the knowledge that one's adversary is also afraid, and his fears can be exploited. In the case of a conflict between two nuclear powers, if either side believed that Waltz's analysis was correct-if either side believed that its adversary would give way rather than run any risk of nuclear attack, as long as his vital interests were not threatened-there would be no reason for that country not to take advantage of that situation. That side could threaten its adversary with nuclear attack if its demands were not met in the firm belief that its opponent was bound to give way, and that it would therefore not be running any risk itself. That belief might turn out to be correct, but if it were not-if its rival was unwilling to allow it to score such an easy victory-there could be very serious trouble indeed. And if both sides were convinced by Waltz's arguments, and both adopted strong deterrent strategies, the situation would be particularly dangerous. Each side would dig in its heels, convinced that when confronted with the risk of nuclear war, the other side would ultimately back down. Such a situation could quickly get out of hand. As Dean Rusk pointed out in 1961, "one of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight." This is an extreme case, but it illustrates the problem. In the real world, states will not be so sure that their opponent "will be deterred" by the prospect of nuclear war and that they can therefore go as far as they like in a political dispute-say, in the Cold War case, in a dispute over Cuba or Berlin. Nor will they themselves, in all probability, be absolutely deterred by the threat of nuclear war. They would be under a certain competitive pressure to play the same game as their rivals; their rivals could not be allowed to profit so easily from a simple threat-making strategy while themselves running no real risk at all. Each side would be afraid of escalation, but each side would in the final analysis also be willing to run a certain risk. Each side would know that its adversary was also worried about what would happen if things got out of hand, and that an unwillingness to run any risk at all would remove that element of restraint and give the adversary too free a hand. Each side would know that its adversary was probably also willing to run a certain risk for the same reason, which is why each side could not be sure that its opponent would be deterred in a confrontation. In such situations, it is impossible to say how all these calculations would sort themselves out. Deterrence cuts in more than one way, and it for this reason that in a nuclear world, no one can know how far things will go before a conflict is resolved, or whether it even can be resolved before nuclear weapons are actually used. Each side may calculate that if it is just a bit tougher, its opponent may back down. Having gone so far, wouldn't it make sense to go further still? And there is no natural end-point to that process. For Waltz, if deterrence fails, "a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid deescalation." But it is just as likely that if a few bombs are exploded, the country that had been targeted would choose to retaliate in kind. It might even choose to escalate the conflict. A political dispute can thus become a gigantic poker game, with each side raising the stakes in the hope that its opponent, frightened by the prospect of nuclear war, will fold before things go too far. Conflicts in such a world, as Thomas Schelling argued years ago, would become "contests in risk-taking." The side with the greater resolve, the side more willing to run the risk of nuclear war, has the upper hand and will prevail in a showdown. In the pre-nuclear world, more or less objective factors-above all, the balance of military power-played a key role in determining how political conflicts ran their course. The weak tended to give way to the strong; in an admittedly rough and imperfect way, the military balance gave some indication as to how a dispute would be worked out. But in a world of invulnerable nuclear forces, as Waltz points out, the military balance counts for little. Subjective factors, like will and resolve, would play the key role in determining how political conflicts are worked out. The result is that in such a world there would be a great premium on resolve, on risk-taking, and perhaps ultimately on recklessness. In international politics, as in other areas of life, what you reward is what you get. Resolve would tend to harden, and the parties involved would tend to dig in their heels. A reputation for toughness would be of fundamental importance, since one has to worry not just about the present but about the future, and this would provide further incentive to take a tough stand. And as each side hardens its position, its rival is also led by competitive pressure to do the same. Why would anyone think that a world of that sort, where political outcomes are up for grabs and victory goes to the side with the strongest nerves, would be particularly stable?

#### Their discursive construction of a “China threat” makes war inevitable

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I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93) For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides.

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#### 5. It is an opportunity cost – defer Neg on this topic – supreme economic theory maximizes opportunity

**Environmental Economics 5** (July 13, <http://www.env-econ.net/2005/07/costbenefit_ana.html>)

The notion that a zero pollution objective is not necessarily ideal policy is one of the more difficult concepts for environmental economists to convey. After all, if pollution is bad shouldn’t we design policy to completely eliminate it? Many of us are drawn to the field based on a genuine concern for the environment and the belief that economics provides a powerful tool for helping solve environmental problems. Yet we are often in the position of recommending policies that appear on the surface to be anti-environmental. How can these observations be reconciled? The answer lies in understanding scarcity: we have unlimited wants, but live in a world with limited means. Economists in general study how people make decisions when faced with scarcity. Scarcity implies that resources devoted to one end are not available to meet another; hence there is an opportunity cost of any action. This includes environmental policy. For example, funds used by a municipality to retrofit its water treatment plant to remove trace amounts of arsenic (a carcinogen) cannot also be used to improve local primary education. Environmental economists are tasked with recommending policies that reflect scarcity of this type at the society level. For both individuals and societies scarcity necessitates tradeoffs, and the reality of tradeoffs can make the complete elimination of pollution undesirable. Once this is acknowledged the pertinent question becomes how much pollution should be eliminated. How should we decide? Who gets to decide? To help provide answers economists use an analytical tool called cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis provides an organizational framework for identifying, quantifying, and comparing the costs and benefits (measured in dollars) of a proposed policy action. The final decision is informed (though not necessarily determined) by a comparison of the total costs and benefits. While this sounds logical enough, cost-benefit analysis has been cause for substantial debate when used in the environmental arena (see the online debate between Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman, and Kerry Smith). The benefits of environmental regulations can include, for example, reduced human and wildlife mortality, improved water quality, species preservation, and better recreation opportunities. The costs are usually reflected in higher prices for consumer goods and/or higher taxes. The latter are market effects readily measured in dollars, while the former are nonmarket effects for which dollar values are not available. In addition to complicating the practice of cost-benefit analysis (dollar values for the nonmarket effects must be inferred rather than directly observed) this raises ethical issues. Should we assign dollar values to undisturbed natural places? To human lives saved? To the existence of blue whales and grey wolves? If we decide such things are too ‘priceless’ to assign dollar values we lose the ability to use cost-benefit analysis to inform the decision. What then is the alternative? How do we decide? Who gets to decide? Environmental economists tend to favor cost-benefit analysis in the policy arena because of the discipline and transparency it provides in evaluating policy options. It is easy to evaluate absolutes. Most would agree that reducing nitrogen contamination of groundwater wells, limiting the occurrence of code red ozone alerts, and preserving habitat for grizzly bears are worthy goals. Determining the relative merits of any one of these compared to the others, or compared to non-environmental goals such as improving public education, is much more daunting. Because policy making is ultimately about evaluating the relative merits of different actions some mechanism is needed to rank the alternatives. Without the discipline of cost-benefit analysis it is not clear how the interests, claims, and opinions of parties affected by a proposed regulation can be examined and compared. Criterion such as ‘moral’ or ‘fair’ do not lend themselves well to comparison and are subject to wide ranging interpretation. Who gets to decide what is moral or fair? Cost-benefit analysis is far from perfect, but it demands a level of objectivity and specificity that are necessary components of good decision making.

#### C) Literature consensus

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An examination of the scholarly literature on economic engagement as an instrument of statecraft reveals a striking pattern. Albert Hirschman’s 1945 study, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, is widely acknowledged today as a starting point for analysis (Hirschman, 1945/1980). Hirschman argued that the conscious cultivation of asymmetrical interdependence, if conducted strategically by the government of a powerful state, would lead weaker states to reorient not only their economies but also their foreign policies to the preferences of the stronger state. He developed a systematic framework for analysis and applied it to the trading and political relationships between Nazi Germany and its central and southeast European neighbors during the interwar period.